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Abstract  
 
Stranger violence can have a variety of different physical, psychological, social and economic 
effects on the victim. In this paper we address one possible impact: namely, a heightened sense of 
uncertainty, risk and fear of violent crime. Drawing on recent advances in the psychology of risk, 
we make three contributions. First, we differentiate in our analysis between primary experience of 
violence (where the individual in question has been attacked by a stranger in the local streets) and 
secondary experience of violence (where the individual knows somebody who has been attacked 
in the local streets by a stranger). Second, we assess whether risk perception (beliefs about the 
likelihood, impact and controllability of future victimization) mediates the empirical links 
between primary and secondary experience of violence and worry about violent crime. Finally, 
we examine whether victimization experience seems to have a greater impact on risk perception 
and worry among people with a high need for cognitive closure (who are averse to uncertainty 
and desire order and structure in their lives). Our findings indicate a number of potentially 
important mediating and moderating effects regarding the impact of stranger violence on fear of 
violent crime. We conclude with some implications for research and policy.  
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Introduction 
Violence can have a variety of different physical, psychological and socio-economic effects on victims, 
communities and societies (Denkers & Winkel, 1998; Green & Diaz, 2007; McCann, Sakheim, & 
Abrahamson, 1988). Violence damages educational attainment and income realization in early adulthood 
(Macmillan, 2001a), exacerbates unemployment or occupational maladjustment after the incident (e.g., 
(Hanson, Sawyer, Begle, & Hubel, 2010; Mezey, Evans, & Hobdell, 2002; Resick, Calhoun, Atkeson, & 
Ellis, 1981), and harms psychological wellbeing and interpersonal relations (Becker, Skinner, Abel, & 
Cichon, 1986; Bunch, Clay-Warner, & Mcmahon-Howard, 2013; Burnam et al., 1988; Golding, 1999; 
Green & Pomeroy, 2007; Hanson et al., 2010; Lurigio, 1987; Macmillan, 2001b; Yap & Devilly, 2004). 
Violence can also impair the socio-economic conditions of individuals and families, especially in 
conjunction with existing problems of poverty and addiction (Denkers & Winkel, 1998; Kilpatrick, 
Acierno, Resnick, Saunders, & Best, 1997; Koss, Woodruff, & Koss, 1990; Norris & Kaniasty, 1994).  
One of the peculiarities of violent victimization pertains to its long-term aftermath. Victims of 
violent crime tend to suffer its effects for longer periods of time compared to victims of other crimes 
(Davis, Taylor, & Lurigio, 1996; Hanson et al., 2010; Macmillan, 2001a; Norris & Kaniasty, 1994). 
Turner et al. (2006) found that cumulative exposure to different types of victimization over a child’s life-
course constitutes a substantial source of depression, aggression and other mental health risks. Other 
studies have shown that violent victimization and exposure to violence in the community can have 
independent and cumulative effects on adolescent mental health, with symptoms ranging from depression, 
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder to substance abuse and criminal offending (Kilpatrick et al., 
1985; Kort-Butler, 2010; M. Kunst, Winkel, & Bogaerts, 2010). In work investigating the pathways to 
self-harm (other than suicide) among women, Nada-Raja & Skegg (2011) found that past victimization 
and post-traumatic stress disorder were significant predictors of self-harm. One possible explanation of 
the long-term effect of violence on mental health and well-being is that violence can shatter the belief in 
personal invulnerability and create a sense of uncertainty and disempowerment (Green & Pomeroy, 2007; 
Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Macmillan & Hagan, 2004).  
In this paper we assess some of the empirical links between prior violent victimization, people’s 
subjective risk judgements, and the frequency with which they worry about violent victimization. 
Building on extant work into fear of crime and the psychology of risk (Custers & Van den Bulck, 2012;  
Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 2013; Killias, 1990; Shippee, 2013; Warr, 1985, 1987; Winkel, 1998) we 
consider two potential downstream effects of stranger violence: first, that victimization experience links 
to people’s subjective sense of the likelihood, impact and uncontrollability of violence; and second, that 
this seemingly elevated sense of risk in turn explains variation in worry about crime. We also examine 
whether people’s need for cognitive closure alters the fitted relationship between victimization 
experience, risk perception and worry. According to prior theory (e.g. Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) 
people who are high in need of cognitive closure prefer definite knowledge, dislike uncertainty, and are 
motivated to attain and maintain closure (i.e., an answer to an ambiguous situation). We explore the 
relevance of such motivated tendencies and proclivities regarding knowledge and certainty to the 
estimated impact of violent victimization. We examine whether people with a high need for cognitive 
closure seem to be especially troubled by the sense of uncertainty and threat that the experience of crime 
can create.  
Following a common empirical strategy in the fear of crime literature we compare average levels 
of risk perception and worry about future victimization among people who have (a) experienced primary 
violent victimization in the past five years, (b) experienced secondary violent victimization in the past 
five years, and (c) not experienced primary of secondary victimization in the past five years. Drawing on 
data from a national probability survey of the general populations of Italy, Bulgaria and Lithuania, and 
building on prior research into the impact of victimization, we differentiate between primary experience 
of stranger violence over the past five years (where the individual in question has been physically 
attacked in the local streets by a stranger) and secondary experience of stranger violence over the past five 
years (where the individual knows of someone who has been physically attacked in the local streets by a 
stranger). Using structural equation modelling to estimate additive and interactive statistical effects, we 
examine empirical associations between violent victimization, need for cognitive closure, risk perception 
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and worry about future victimization. While we analyse observational data, we hope that our findings 
nevertheless shed light on how victimization experience links to the salience and appraisal of risk 
regarding future victimization. 
The paper proceeds as follows. After giving a brief sketch of how the various predictions come 
together to form a coherent whole, we describe more fully each of the three main objectives. We then 
outline the methodology. Following a presentation of findings, our concluding remarks focus on future 
avenues of research, as well as some policy implications of our results. 
 
An overview 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the three main objectives of the study in the form of potential pathways 
between victimization experience and worry. Note that because we employ data from a national 
probability survey of three European countries, our empirical strategy involves estimating conditional 
correlations in the various populations of interest. With that caveat set, consider some possible empirical 
links between the constructs depicted in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We first examine whether primary and secondary victims of violence are more worried about 
crime than non-victims, and if they are, whether seemingly elevated perceptions of risk among victims 
explain some or all of the statistical effects. Following recent criminological research into the psychology 
of risk, we define subjective risk as perceptions of the likelihood and controllability of the uncertain and 
undesirable event, as well as perceptions of the impact of the event if it were to occur (see inter alia 
Acuña-Rivera, Brown, & Uzzell, 2014; Custers & Van den Bulck, 2012; Ireland, 2011; Jackson, 2006, 
2009; Killias, 1990; Killias & Clerici, 2000; Shippee, 2013; Warr & Stafford, 1983; Warr, 1987). 
Conceiving of personal threat as not just one’s subjective probability of a negative uncertain event, but 
also one’s beliefs about its controllability and consequences, we examine whether victims of violence 
(compared to non-victims) tend to see violence as more likely, as more consequential for the victim, and 
as more difficult to control. We also assess whether varying levels of risk perception help to explain why 
victims of violence worry more than non-victims. Might experience of violence be related to higher on 
average subjective risk? Might heightened subjective risk in turn be related to higher average levels of 
worry about violent attack? 
The second objective is to examine ‘risk sensitivity’ (Warr, 1985) in the context of interpersonal 
violence. Risk sensitivity is the idea that likelihood and other risk judgements (like impact) ‘multiply’ to 
generate emotional response (meaning an interactive, rather than additive, statistical effect should be 
observed). Imagine a hypothetical dial that you can use to shift up or down the level of everyone’s 
subjective probability of violent victimization. Turn the dial up and everyone’s perceived likelihood goes 
up. Turn the dial down and everyone’s perceived likelihood goes down. According to the risk sensitivity 
model, turning the dial up will result in higher expected levels of worry for the entire group, but the 
increase in average levels of worry will be especially strong among those who associate violence with 
especially serious personal consequence (Warr, 1987), who believe that violence is difficult to control 
(Jackson, 2011), and who already have an aversion to ambiguity (Jackson, 2013).  
As the dial is turned up, the increased likelihood brings the event closer to oneself subjectively 
and emotional response heightens. But the frequency and impact of worry is expected to be stronger 
among individuals who believe that violence has an especially severe impact on the victim and who 
represent the event as highly difficult to control. Why might risk sensitivity be relevant to the relationship 
between the experience of violence and worry about violent victimization? It seems to us plausible that, 
as a result of their experience, primary and secondary victims tend to represent the expected impact of 
violence as higher and its controllability as lower compared to people without direct or vicarious 
experience. The very fact that the event has transpired may raise (on average) the possibility that it could 
happen again; may make it seem (on average) more difficult to control by the victim because it has 
occurred already; and may make the consequences (on average) seem more severe. If this is so – and if 
perceived control and perceived consequence strengthen the fitted relationship between subjective 
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probability and affect (Warr, 1987: 38; Jackson, 2011: 516) – then we might reasonably conclude that 
victims of violence are more ‘sensitive to risk’ than non-victims. Victims (a) see their risk to be higher 
than non-victim, and (b) these constitutive elements of risk perception subsequently combine interactively 
to predict frequent worry about crime. 
The third objective is to consider the relevance of need for cognitive closure to the potential 
impact of violent victimization and worry about crime. Psychological research has shown that people vary 
in their basic need to believe that things are stable, certain and predictable. Need for cognitive closure 
refers to an epistemic function of closed-mindedness (versus open-mindedness) that shapes how people 
make sense of and form knowledge about the world (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, 2004). On 
the one hand, people with a high need for cognitive closure are said to prefer their world to be ‘black-and-
white,’ i.e. clear, understandable and easily categorizable. On the other hand, people with a low need for 
cognitive closure seem to prefer variety, flexibility of thought and uncertainty (and as such tolerate 
ambiguity). Prior criminological work (Jackson, 2013) has found that need for closure moderated the 
observed association between perceived likelihood and worry about crime. Might need for cognitive 
closure also moderate the estimated impact of violent victimization? We assess whether victims who 
prefer definite knowledge and eschew uncertainty seem to be especially affected by the sense of risk and 
unpredictability that violence conceivably brings into their lives. 
Having presented a general overview of the three objectives of the present study, we expand upon 
each in more detail in the next three sections. The first relates to the idea that risk perception links prior 
victimization experience to worry about future victimization. 
 
Objective 1: Does risk perception mediate the relationship between victimization and worry? 
The association between previous victimization and fear of crime is one of the most studied topics in the 
fear of crime literature, and most of this work distinguishes between types of crime (e.g., violent and 
property crime) and between direct (primary) versus indirect (secondary) victimization (see Brunton-
Smith & Sturgis, 2011; Drakulich, 2014; Riggs & Cook, 2014; Rountree, 1998; Tyler, 1980). Out of this 
body of research has come a good deal of evidence that the more experience people have of victimization 
the more fearful they are on average, albeit with a fair amount of variation in the strength of the estimated 
effects (Balkin, 1979; Covington & Taylor, 1991; Garofalo, 1979; Kury & Ferdinand, 1998; Liska, 
Sancirico, & Reed, 1988; Rountree, 1998; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; Skogan, 1987; Stafford & Galle, 
1984). Moreover, hearing about events and knowing others who have been victimised is also associated 
with greater fear of crime (Chiricos, Eschholz, Gertz, & Chiricos, 1997; Covington & Taylor, 1991; 
Ferraro, 1995; Kinsella, 2012; LaGrange et al., 1992; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; Tyler, 1980, 1984; 
Winkel, 1998).  
Given the focus of the current study on worry about future victimization, it is important to define 
worry clearly. To do this we draw on Berenbaum’s (Berenbaum, 2010: 963) initiation-termination two 
phase model. Berenbaum defines worry as repetitive and anxiety-producing thoughts that have three 
characteristics: ‘…(1) the repetitive thoughts concern an uncertain future outcome; (2) the uncertain 
outcome about which the person is thinking is considered undesirable; and (3) the subjective experience 
of having such thoughts is unpleasant.’ Uncertainty is central to this definition. As Berenbaum (ibid: 964-
965) puts it ‘If one is certain that an undesirable future event will occur, one can anticipate it and grieve 
about it, but one cannot worry about it…As it turns out, remarkably few outcomes are certain relative to 
the number of outcomes that are uncertain.’ 
Berenbaum’s model draws attention not just to the links between perceived threat and emotion 
(people worry about an uncertain future event that poses a threat to something of value) but also to worry 
as a dynamic process that unfolds over time. On the one hand, worry is initiated by the perceived 
probability and cost of undesirable future outcomes, as well as the salience of risk and threat; one may 
start to worry about an event that suddenly seems likely, costly and salient. On the other hand, people 
continue to worry unless they can come to accept the uncertain future possibility and have taken whatever 
efforts they can to prevent or cope with the threat; one may stop worrying when one becomes comfortable 
with the possibility that the threat might still be realized. From a psychological perspective, this 
acceptance of threat is linked to one’s desire for certainty, beliefs about the value of worrying, a 
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perseverative-iterative style (i.e., the tendency to focus on an object of concern by repeatedly thinking 
about the next possible step in a chain of connected outcomes), and a sense of closure in one’s role to 
prevent or cope with the threat (i.e., the sense that every possible preventative or coping action has been 
taken).  
While we do not address many of the more intricate aspects of Berenbaum’s account of worry 
and the worry process, we do use this theoretical model to guide our understanding of the links between 
prior experience of crime and worry about future victimization. Figure 2 summarizes the first objective, 
which is to investigate whether primary and secondary victimization predict worry about future 
victimization directly (bypassing risk perception) and indirectly (where the estimated statistical effects 
run via risk perception).  Note (a) that there are multiple pathways linking previous victimization to risk 
perception to worry about violence (these are posited mediational paths running from both primary and 
secondary victimization via the three different dimensions of risk perception) and (b) that the two 
pathways denoted ‘B’ link primary and secondary victimization directly to worry (these are posited 
statistical effects bypassing risk perception). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
According to the proposed pathways from victimization experience to risk perception to worry, 
primary and secondary victims of stranger violence are expected to have higher on average levels of 
worry about violent victimization (in the case of primary victims of it happening again, and in the case of 
secondary victims of it happening to oneself) than non-victims because of a seemingly heightened sense 
of personal risk. In particular, primary and secondary victimization experience may shape people’s beliefs 
about the likelihood, impact and controllability of stranger violence (higher average levels of perceived 
likelihood, higher average levels of perceived consequence, and lower average levels of perceived 
control), leading the two victim groups to have heightened levels of risk perception compared to the non-
victim group. Risk perception may then be strongly associated with worry about future victimization, 
with higher levels of worry being expressed by the two victim groups compared to the non-victims. Given 
the dynamic nature of the worry process, a heightened sense of risk may at first initiate worry but then 
maintain the worry process through a continuing sense of threat.  
Having considered the possibility that risk perception mediates the estimated statistical effects of 
victimization on worry, we consider next the potential direct effect of victimization experience on worry 
(see the two ‘B’ pathways in Figure 1). Why might past experiences of stranger violence predict worry 
about falling victim of violence directly, i.e., irrespective of perceived risk? Berenbaum’s model is again 
instructive in that the definition of threat includes not just probability and impact, but also the salience of 
risk and threat. The addition of salience in the definition reflects a rather fundamental point: namely 
‘…that the number of variety of undesirable outcomes that could befall individuals is unlimited. As a 
result, humans are constantly surrounded by potentially threatening stimuli. Despite this, most people 
most of the time, are not aware of the threats to their safety and well-being. In order to perceive a threat 
one must be aware of its presence’ (Berenbaum, ibid: 966).  
From this perspective, one may view any number of future uncertain events as likely and costly, 
but one might also have to see a particular event as salient to be worried about that transpiring rather than 
another event. In the current context it is plausible that primary and secondary victimization experience 
makes crime salient, thereby explaining any direct statistical effect of victimization experience on worry 
that bypasses risk perception. While this is pure speculation, it may be that salience works in part via 
affective imagery, i.e. mental representations of the risk that have feelings attached because of prior 
experience and prior learning (Slovic et al., 1998). It seems to us plausible that experiencing directly the 
event and hearing about somebody else being physically attacked generates representations of violence 
that have an affective charge, which in turn heightens salience. 2   
                                                   
2
 Given the situated nature of fear of crime in public space, it is also possible that victims of crime ‘see’ social and physical cues 
in their environment differently to non-victims because of the salience and affective imagery. For instance, victims may more 
actively look for signs of criminal threat in their environment, and to more readily interpret ambiguous cues as signs of potential 
danger. We know from a variety of different studies that different people can come to different conclusions about the same 
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Objective 2: Are victims sensitive to risk? 
At the heart of the idea of risk sensitivity (Warr, 1985, 1987) is two linked ideas: (a) that ‘perceived 
likelihood multiplies with perceived consequence’ to produce the emotional appraisal of threat; and (b) 
that different social groups associate victimization with different levels of expected consequence (and, in 
an extension of this work, with different levels of expected controllability). The risk sensitivity 
perspective seeks thus to explain why different groups will be differentially fearful even if they see the 
likelihood of crime to be equally low or equally high (Chadee, Austin, & Ditton, 2007; Custers & Van 
den Bulck, 2012; J. Jackson, 2011; Warr, 1987) 
In the first study on this topic, Warr (1985) considered the idea that females tended to see crimes 
as more serious than males partly because they tended to view certain types of crime as a prelude to 
more serious ones (so-called ‘perceptually contemporaneous offenses’ since one event is judged to 
covary with another event). He found that the association between perceived likelihood and worry was 
stronger among people who believed a particular crime was especially serious – and was associated with 
other crimes (e.g., where burglary could also lead to sexual assault). He concluded with the notion that 
people are ‘sensitive to risk’ when they associate a particular event with very serious consequences, such 
that an increase in the subjective probability of a hazard will have an especially strong impact on fear of 
(or worry about) future victimization.  
This work has since been extended to include perceived control and need for cognitive closure. 
First, Jackson (2011) found that a sense of personal consequence and a sense of control moderated the 
observed association between perceived likelihood and worry. The observed correlation between 
perceived likelihood and worry about future victimization was stronger among people who associated 
criminal victimisation with strong personal consequences and among people who believed these events 
were difficult to control. Second, Jackson (2013) found that need for cognitive closure strengthened the 
observed correlation between perceived likelihood and worry. The observed correlation between 
perceived likelihood and worry about future victimization was stronger among people who had a strong 
need for certainty, order and structure. 
To our knowledge the idea that victims are more sensitive to risk than non-victims has not yet 
been studied. To fill this gap we test two connected predictions:  
 
1. that victims tend to believe that victimization is less controllable and more serious in its impact 
(compared to non-victims); and, 
2. that perceived likelihood, perceived control and perceived consequences have interactive 
estimated effects on worry about crime. More specifically, that the association between worry 
and perceived likelihood is higher among people who view the consequences to be high and the 
controllability to be low. 
 
We predict that the relation between perceived likelihood and worry about stranger violence will be 
stronger among the two victim groups compared to the non-victim group, (a) because victims have an 
elevated sense of the consequences of victimization and a lower perceived level of control, and (b) 
because perceived consequence and perceived control moderate the estimated relationship between 
perceived likelihood and worry.   
Figure 3 gives an overview of the basic elements of the risk sensitivity model, with victim 
groups added as predictors of risk perception. Interpreting the model through the lens of observational 
data, we might say that victims may worry more (compared to non-victims) about a risk that they all 
construe at a given and fixed level of likelihood, because victims tend to represent the consequences 
attached to the risk as more serious than non-victims, and because victims tend to represent the event as 
less controllable than non-victims. Viewed through the lens of experimental data, we might say that a 
given exogenous increase in the subjective probability of victimization may have a bigger impact on the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
environmental cues in the context of difference, deviance, disorder and crime (Harcourt, 2001; Ross & Mirowsky, 2009; 
Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). It is for future research to examine whether victimization experience is relevant here. 
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affective response of victims than it would have on the affective response of non-victims, again because 
victims tend to construe the event as more severe in its consequences and more difficult to control. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Objective 3: Does the need for cognitive closure heighten the estimated impact of victimization on 
risk perception and worry? 
The final part of our framework focuses on people’s aversion to uncertainty and their preference for 
definite knowledge. According to Kruglanski and Webster (1996: 278) need for cognitive closure is: 
 
‘…a desire for definite knowledge on some issue and the eschewal of confusion and 
ambiguity … need for closure is presumed to exert its effects via two general tendencies: 
the urgency tendency, reflecting the inclination to attain closure as quickly as possible, and 
the permanence tendency, reflecting the tendency to maintain it for as long as possible.’  
 
Might the associations between victimization, perceived risk and worry be moderated by need for 
cognitive closure? Might, in other words, the impact of violent victimization on risk perception and worry 
depend upon a psychological proclivity to order and certainty in people’s lives?  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Prior theory suggests that need for cognitive closure could moderate the estimated statistical 
effects of primary and secondary victimization (Figure 4). Recall that our definition of worry stresses 
uncertainty in the face of a negative outcome possibly being realised. By heightening subjective risk, 
primary and secondary victimization brings uncertainty into people’s lives, where what was previously a 
rather abstract and irrelevant potential event suddenly becomes something psychologically present and 
real. In the immediate aftermath of victimization, one would predict that people with a high need for 
cognitive closure will be motivated to act in ways that reduce the uncertainty, by e.g., seeking information 
about the danger in an attempt to reduce their risk status, and trying to do all that they can do to stop 
worrying (because they are averse to uncertainty).  
Yet, theory also predicts that people with a high need for cognitive closure will use less complex 
information-seeking strategies, to employ more basic heuristics, and to more readily ‘seize’ on media 
representations of crime and ‘freeze’ on the sense of risk and harm (cf. Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
They are expected to process less information before committing to a judgement; to base judgements on 
early cues; to rely on stereotypes rather than de-individuating information; and to be motivated to keep 
close to initial impressions rather than correct them in the light of subsequent evidence.  
Accordingly, we predict that victimization experience has stronger statistical effects on risk 
perception and worry among people with a high need for cognitive closure (Figure 4). People with a high 
need for cognitive closure may ‘seize’ and ‘freeze’ on information from the experience itself and from 
that sought in the aftermath. They try to make sense of the sudden salient risk, yet ironically, their 
aversion to uncertainty and rush to try to reduce uncertainty may, if anything, increase subjective threat 
and produce more powerful affective imagery. Take secondary victimization experience: people with a 
high need for cognitive closure may be motivated to find out as much as possible about their own 
personal risk as a way of getting closure, yet their strategies for searching for information may lead them 
to find out more about the event and ‘freeze’ on frightening details. This may help to only increase risk 
salience and thus only to heighten their worry about future victimization. 
Finally, we posit a statistical interaction between need for cognitive closure and perceived 
likelihood on worry (Figure 4). As mentioned earlier Jackson (2013) found that need for cognitive closure 
increased the fitted relationship between perceived likelihood and worry. This suggests that risk 
sensitivity is not just about representations of the impact and the controllability of a given personal threat, 
but also about the individual differences in need for order, certainty and predictability.  
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Present Study 
To recap, we examine first whether primary and secondary victims tend to see their personal risk of future 
victimization to be higher than non-victims, and whether perceived risk and victimization in turn predicts 
worry; second, whether primary and secondary victims are more sensitive to risk than non-victims; and 
third, whether need for cognitive closure impacts on the associations between prior victimization, risk 
perception and worry.  
 
Method 
Our data come from a nationally representative survey of adults in Italy, Bulgaria and Lithuania, 
conducted between October and November 2010 as part of the project Euro-Justis (Hough & Sato, 2011), 
which was funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme. The Italian sample 
comprises 522 individuals, aged 16 and over, with a response rate of 28%. The sample was selected via 
quota sampling, using regions and city sizes (interlocked), gender and age (interlocked), education level 
and occupation as quotas. The 111 sampling points were selected randomly. The Bulgarian sample covers 
the entire population of Bulgaria aged 18 and over, with a response rate of 63%. The sampling method 
followed was a two-stage random route cluster sample; first, selecting 126 random nationwide sample of 
clusters based on a list of electoral sections and second, selecting the 1,008 participants themselves. The 
Lithuanian sample comprised 1,021 individuals, with a response rate of 37%, using multi-stage random 
sampling, covering 18 towns and 54 villages. Table 1 presents the demographic composition of the three 
samples.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Measures 
Worry about stranger violence. Our measures focus on the frequency of worry in the past year and the 
negative impact of worry on one’s quality-of-life. Echoing the European Social Survey indicators of 
worry about crime (for more details, see Jackson & Kuha, 2014), respondents were first asked: ‘During 
the last 12 months have you ever felt worried about being physically attacked in the street by a stranger?’. 
Those answering yes in the filter question were then asked ‘How many times have you felt like this in the 
past 12 months?’: ‘all or most of the time’ (n= 31), ‘some of the time’ (n= 104), ‘just occasionally’ (n= 
39) and ‘never’ (n= 922). Participants who answered yes to the filter question were also asked whether 
their worry about being physically attacked in the street by a stranger had an effect on their quality of 
life’: ‘not at all’ (n= 295), ‘a little’ (n= 437),‘moderately’ (n= 239), ‘quiet a bit’ (n= 39), and ‘very 
much’ (n= 17). 
Risk perception. Perceived likelihood, control and consequence were each measured using a 
single indicator: ‘How likely do you think it is that you will be physically attacked in the street by a 
stranger during the next twelve months?’ [1= ‘definitely not going to happen’ (n= 574); 2 (n= 759); 3 (n= 
969); 4 (n= 190); 5= ‘certain to happen’ (n= 48)]; ‘To what extent do you feel personally able to control 
whether or not you will be physically attacked in the street by a stranger during the next twelve months?’ 
[1= ‘not at all able’(n= 556); 2 (n= 553); 3 (n= 881); 4 (n= 415); 5= ‘to a very great extent’ (n= 143)]; 
and ‘To what extent do you think your life will be affected if you are physically attacked in the street by a 
stranger during the next twelve months?’, [1= ‘not affected much at all’ (n= 170); 2 (n= 277); 3 (n= 607); 
4 (n= 666);  5= ‘affected to a very great extent’ (n= 828)].  
Need for cognitive closure. For reasons of space a shortened version of the standardized scale of 
the ‘need for cognitive closure’ (with 42 items), was used, covering four of the five dimensions of the 
construct (see Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic, 2002). Respondents were asked to 
express their agreement or disagreement, with the following statements: ‘I enjoy having a clear and 
structured mode of life’ (order) [‘disagree strongly’ (n= 13), ‘disagree’ (n= 141),‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ (n= 449), ‘agree’ (n= 1,077), and ‘agree strongly’ (n= 744)]; ‘I don't like to go into a situation 
without knowing what I can expect from it’ (predictability) [‘disagree strongly’ (n= 18), ‘disagree’ (n= 
93),‘neither agree nor disagree’ (n= 311), ‘agree’ (n= 1,354), and ‘agree strongly’ (n= 736)]; ‘I don't like 
situations that are uncertain’ (ambiguity) [‘disagree strongly’ (n= 24), ‘disagree’ (n= 76),‘neither agree 
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nor disagree’ (n= 302), ‘agree’ (n= 1,426), and ‘agree strongly’ (n= 691)]; and ‘I dislike questions which 
could be answered in many different ways’ (closed-mindedness) [‘disagree strongly’ (n= 43), ‘disagree’ 
(n= 201),‘neither agree nor disagree’ (n= 551), ‘agree’ (n= 1,140), and ‘agree strongly’ (n= 504)].  
Violent victimization. Two survey questions were used to examine primary and secondary 
experience of stranger violence. In line with the International Crime and Victim Survey (van Dijk, van 
Kesteren, & Smit, 2007), respondents were asked if they had fallen victim of physical assault in the street 
by a stranger in the last 5 years (primary victimization); they were also asked if they knew someone in 
their area who had fallen victim of physical assault in the street by a stranger in the last 5 years 
(secondary victimization). Pooling the data, there were 116 primary victims, 645 secondary victims and 
92 who had both been a victim of physical assault and knew someone in the locality who had been a 
victim of physical assault. 
 
Analytical strategy 
To model statistical associations between latent constructs and manifest indicators, we employ a 
combination of path analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM, see  Bartholomew, Knott & 
Moustaki, 2011). Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used to include each 
respondent’s answers in the likelihood function of all fitted models, under the assumption that the missing 
data were Missing at Random (MAR, in the sense of Rubin, 1976).3 Data were pooled from the three 
countries, with fixed effects for country membership included in the fitted models. Following Jackson 
(2013) we assume that, while country of residence might predict levels of worrying, country membership 
will not moderate the strength of the associations between the factors of current interest, e.g., perceived 
likelihood and worry about victimization. Finally, all models were fitted with and without socio-
demographic covariates, namely gender, age and country of residence. The effect on the key parameter 
estimates of theoretical interest was, in all cases, inconsequential.  
 
Results 
Testing additive and interactive statistical effects of risk perception on worry about stranger violence (see 
Figure 5), our findings echo previous research into fear of crime (e.g. Custers & van den Bulck, 2013). 
We see that perceived likelihood is a strong predictor of worry about victimization (b= .21, p<.001), as is 
perceived consequence (b= .12, p<.001) and perceived controllability (b= -.18, p<.001). From the two 
estimated interaction effects, we also see that the association between perceived likelihood and worry is 
weaker when people feel that violence is controllable (b= -.03, p<.05), and stronger when people feel that 
violence has serious consequences (b= .05, p<.001). Of course, these interaction effects are to be 
interpreted symmetrically. Thus, at high levels of perceived likelihood, the negative association between 
perceived controllability and worry is stronger and the positive association between perceived 
consequence and worry is stronger.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 6 adds victimization experience to the model. The pathways from primary victimization to 
cognitive and affective reactions to violent victimization can be summarized as follows. First, primary 
victimization is associated with higher fitted levels of perceived likelihood of falling victim of stranger 
violence (b= .46, p<.001), p<.001), higher fitted levels of perceived consequences (b=.16, p<.001) and 
lower fitted levels of perceived controllability (b= -.28, p<.001). Second, these three aspects of perceived 
risk have additive and interactive statistical effects on worry. Third, there is a significant (and large) direct 
statistical effect of primary victimization on worry (b= .78, p<.001).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                   
3
 The number of missing values for the individual indicators ranged from 1 to 125, with no respondent having missing values on 
all manifest variables. 
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What about secondary victimization (Figure 6)? Having heard about others’ physical assault in 
the local streets by a stranger is related to higher fitted levels of perceived likelihood of falling victim of 
stranger violence (b= .25, p<.001), and higher fitted levels of perceived consequences (b=.22, p<.001), 
but not to lower fitted levels of perceived controllability (b= .04, p=.33). Moreover, there is a significant 
direct statistical effect of secondary victimization on worry (b= .37, p<.001).  
Recall the first objective of the current study, which was to assess (a) whether primary and 
secondary victimization predicts risk perception and worry about violence, and (b) whether risk 
perception mediates some of the statistical effects. Our analysis indicates that both are occurring. What 
about the second objective – to assess whether victims of crime can be called ‘sensitive to risk’, in the 
sense that they hold representations of crime (specifically about its impact and controllability) that 
heightens the link between subjective probabilities and affect. Combining the finding that perceived 
consequence of violent victimization interacted with perceived likelihood to predict worry (see Figure 5) 
with the higher expected levels of risk perception (likelihood and consequence) among primary and 
secondary victims, we can infer that primary and secondary victims are sensitive to risk.  
Primary and secondary victims are more likely to perceive the consequences of a violent 
victimization as serious compared to non-victims, and these perceptions strengthen the fitted association 
between perceived likelihood and worry. This implies, for instance, that primary and secondary victims 
will worry more than non-victims at the same level of subjective likelihood, because they tend to represent 
the impact of the event as more severe in its consequences than non-victims.  
The final step is to add need for cognitive closure. We find a statistically significant interaction – 
using latent moderated structural equations, taking into account the non-normality caused by the latent 
nonlinear terms (see  Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000) – between need for cognitive closure and perceived 
likelihood when predicting worry (b=.17, p<.01).4 We also test a series of interaction effects involving 
need for cognitive closure and victimization experience (primary and secondary). Table 2 summarises 
the results.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 We find no statistical interaction involving need for cognitive closure and primary victimization 
experience, and only one statistical interaction involving need for cognitive closure and secondary 
victimization experience. Among people with a high need for cognitive closure, the association between 
secondary victimization experience and worry is stronger, compared to people with a lower need for 
cognitive closure (b=.34, p<.05). If one interprets a statistical effect of victimization experience on worry 
(one that bypasses risk perception) as a heightened sense of risk salience, then it seems from the current 
analysis that secondary victimization creates a stronger sense of risk salience among people who desire 
order in their lives and dislike uncertainty and ambiguity, resulting in stronger affective responses. 
Hearing about someone in the neighbourhood being attacked by a stranger in public space may generally 
creates affective imagery of risk that increases the salience of threat, but this may be especially true 
among people who are averse to the uncertainty that secondary victimization brings. We discuss this 
further in the discussion section. 
 
Discussion 
Summary and directions for future research 
In this study we have built upon a massive amount of research showing that victimization can be a 
traumatic experience with a variety of negative consequences (Denkers & Winkel, 1998; Green & Diaz, 
2007; Norris & Kaniasty, 1994). Drawing upon extant work into the psychology of risk, we have linked 
direct and indirect victimization to people’s feelings and thoughts about the subjective threat of falling 
victim of stranger violence. Our starting premises have been (a) that the experience of crime can shape 
perceptions of risk and threat; (b) that perceptions of risk and threat comprise not just people’s 
assessments of the likelihood of victimization, but also their beliefs about the seriousness of the 
                                                   
4
 Main effects of need for cognitive closure and perceived likelihood were b=.27, p<.01 and b=.20, p<.001 (respectively). Please 
contact the first author for full details of this particular fitted model. 
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consequences if they were to fall victim and their sense of control over the event occurring; (c) that these 
perceptions are correlated with emotional reactions to risk; and (d) that need for cognitive closure may 
also alter the impact of victimization experience on perceived risk and worry about violent crime. 
Applying these ideas to stranger violence in public space, we have made three empirical 
contributions. First, we have shown that primary and secondary victimization experiences are strongly 
associated with higher levels of worry. While this may not be terribly surprising to many readers, 
compared to prior work  the statistical effects of violent victimization on worry about violent 
victimization were relatively large in magnitude. We recommend that future research assesses whether 
this is because physical attack in the local streets by a stranger is a particularly serious and frightening 
crime.  
We also found that the association between victimization experience and worry was only partly 
mediated by higher fitted levels of perceived likelihood of falling victim of violence, perceived 
consequence, and perceived controllability (in the case of primary victimization). There were strong 
direct effects of victimization on worry. More work is needed to assess the meaning of the effects of 
victimization experience on affect that bypass risk perception. In our view, Berenbaum’s (2010) model of 
worry can guide such work. On his account, threat comprises not just likelihood and impact but also 
salience. It may be that primary and secondary victimization experience raises the salience of 
victimization (by generating affectively laden representations of violence, i.e. mental imagery, of the 
uncertain event) in a way that initiates and helps to maintain worry about victimization above and beyond 
any effects of risk perception.  
Second, our study has extended the risk sensitivity framework of Warr and others (Jackson, 2011, 
2013; Warr, 1985, 1987). Our data indicate that both primary and secondary victims of violence were 
sensitive to risk, in that they tended to see the consequences to be higher than non-victims, which in turn 
seemed to strengthen the conditional correlation between perceived likelihood and worry. This adds to 
prior evidence that particular social groups (e.g., women) are sensitive to risk because they tend to 
associate particular crimes with relatively severe consequences (Warr, 1985). We recommend future work 
attempts to replicate this finding, turns to examine whether other groups are sensitive to risk, and moves 
to experimental designs to the core idea that it is not just ‘likelihood + impact = affect’ but rather 
‘likelihood x impact = affect.’ 
Third, we showed that need for cognitive closure moderated only one of the estimated effects of 
victimization experience. According to Kruglanski and Webster (1996), people with a high need for 
cognitive closure rush to answers and certainty, form judgments quickly and strongly, and prefer not to 
alter their swiftly formed beliefs in the wake of alternative or supplement evidence. Our analysis was 
guided by the idea that victimization experience brings uncertainty and ambiguity into people’s lives; that 
people with a high need for cognitive closure are motivated to reduce that uncertainty and ambiguity; and 
that if they cannot do so, they will find the threat particularly unsettling. In accordance with this, we 
found that high need for cognitive closure seemed to alter the modelled relationships between secondary 
victimization experience and worry about future victimization. That this was not the case with primary 
victims suggests something specific about mediated or indirect experience in the context of need for 
cognitive closure and worry about violent victimization. It is for future research to examine whether 
secondary victimization hinders the acceptance of non-negligible risk, whereas primary victimization 
does not.  
One line of future work could focus on need for cognitive closure and information searching and 
processing  in the context of secondary victimization. People with a high need for cognitive closure have 
a preference for definite knowledge and an aversion to ambiguity. Hearing about local crime events may 
present a particularly strong threat to their sense of stability and certainty, who may be especially 
motivated to find out more about crime in order to reduce the sense of threat. Psychological theory 
predicts that these individuals will first ‘seize’ on information that permits a judgment on the topic of 
interest, and second ‘freeze’ on such judgment, becoming relatively closed-minded to alternative 
information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). By seizing 
and freezing on information that makes the risk of victimization more personally relevant, these 
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individuals might ironically find it difficult to reduce uncertainty and difficult to become comfortable 
with non-negligible risk, meaning that worry about crime becomes more persistent over time.  
 
Limitations  
There are, of course, limitations to the study that must be acknowledged. The first stems from its 
observational nature. While experimental design generates the leverage to isolate and detect causal 
effects, violent victimization does not lend itself to ethical manipulation under experimental conditions. 
Modelling naturally occurring variation in general and special populations is thus particularly important. 
Moreover, this was the first study to assess the links between victimization experience and fear of crime 
in the form that we developed (i.e., bringing in risk perception and need for cognitive closure). We see the 
value of an observational snapshot that can highlight regularities for further work to explore in more 
detail using different methodologies. 
The second limitation is our inability to track the dynamics of worry over time. Future research 
might explore covariates that are related to wider worrying mechanisms, such as need for cognitive 
closure, using longitudinal research designs. Psychological work shows, for example, that acceptance of 
non-negligible risk might decrease worrying. The acceptance that stems from one’s need for cognitive 
closure has been found to relate to factors, such as disinclination of problem solving approaches to risks, a 
tendency to avoid exposure to risk, and levels of concreteness of perceived threat and emotional clarity 
(Borkovec et al., 2004; Davey, 1994; Gohm & Clore, 2002; Stober & Borkovec, 2002). Longitudinal 
studies could pave the way for the development of more integrated, interdisciplinary approaches to fear of 
crime. 
The third limitation relates to the nature of the explanatory variables that are included in our 
analysis, and which focus at the individual-level. Future research might examine whether other types of 
covariates (e.g., community-level and/or societal-level) influence the pathways explored in the current 
study. One example of such factors is the environmental and social characteristics of one’s local area, 
which have been found to predict fear of crime (see Wyant, 2008; Brunton-Smith, Jackson, & Sutherland, 
2014; Brunton-Smith & Sturgis, 2011). Does victimization experience increase people’s perception of 
neighbourhood disorder and social disorganization, with knock-on effects on risk perception and worry 
about victimization? Another example is national levels of welfare state provision. Previous research has 
shown, for instance, that welfare security arrangements are negatively related to fear of crime 
(Hummelsheim, Hirtenlehner, Jackson, & Oberwittler, 2011). Future work may analyse both the 
neighbourhood and national context of fear of crime using an ambitious multi-level framework. 
 
Lessons for policy  
Albeit not within the scope of the current study, our findings do have policy implications. A common 
wisdom in victim-support services is that abnormal events, such as criminal victimization, increase 
negative affect (e.g., worry), and thus the key objective of these interventions is to bring the affective 
reactions back to ‘normal’ levels (Winkel, 1998, p. 481). In our view, a victim-support policy that focuses 
solely on negative affectivity and overlooks factors of a more cognitive and behavioural nature, might fail 
to address victims’ real needs. In a study exploring the associations between the combination of negative 
affectivity and social inhibition, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among victims of violence, 
Kunst et al. (2011) found that it is not so much the negative affect per se that makes it more likely for 
victims of violence to develop PTSD, but the strategies that they adopt (or not) in order to cope with the 
violent victimization, such as the degree of expressing emotions and inhibiting behaviours in social 
interactions.  
Importantly, PSTD and poor well-being of victims have been found to relate to factors, such as 
catastrophizing, social inhibition, beliefs about the value of worrying, intolerance of uncertainty and so 
on. In a study that investigated the prevalence of PTSD among victims of violence who applied for state 
compensation with the Dutch Victim Compensation Fund (Kunst et al., 2010: 1646), it was found that if 
additional factors (such as age, sex, acquaintance with the perpetrators) to negative affectivity are 
assessed properly in the examination of the application phase, victims likely to develop PTSD, and who 
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remain unidentified in the first stage of the process, may still be identified and referred to the appropriate 
support services before their files are closed. 
Our study indicates that the affective response of victims of violence may partly be mediated by 
risk perception, such as the likelihood and the impact of violent victimization, and that the affective 
response of secondary victims of violence may also be partly moderated by their need for certainty, order 
and structure. These findings indicate that cognitive factors are important in explaining the underlying 
mechanisms of the association between experience and affect. Therefore, to help victims of violence to 
cope effectively with the immediate damage caused by the victimization experience, and to prevent the 
development of more persistent mental health problems and damages in their well-being, screening them 
for cognitive factors, such as risk perception and need for closure appears to be important. Victim support 
policies should focus on such cognitive parameters, which might prevent victims from coming to terms 
with non-negligible risk, and thus contribute in ‘delayed’ (rather than immediate) but persistent emotional 
reactions to violent victimization.  
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Figure 1: Overview of the theoretical model 
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*A*, *B*and *C* denote hypothesised interaction effects. Specifically, need for cognitive closure may strengthen observed 
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Figure 2: Additive associations between victimisation experience, risk perception and worry about 
stranger violence
 
  
PATHWAY B [primary victimization] 
Note that all pathways not denoted ‘pathway B’ are potential routes (organised under pathway B)  
by which risk perception mediates statistical effects of victimization experience on worry.  
Note also that perceived control and perceived consequences are also expected to covary 
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Figure 3: Risk sensitivity 
 
  
 
Note that the lines that intercept the directed arrows indicate posited interactive effects. Also note that the direct 
pathways from primary and secondary victimization to worry have been omitted for visual ease 
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Figure 4: Interactive statistical effects of primary victimization and need for cognitive closure on risk 
perception and worry about victimization 
 
 
  
Note that the lines that intercept the directed arrows indicate posited interactive effects. Also note 
that the interactive effects involving (a) likelihood and control and (b) likelihood and consequences 
are omitted for visual ease. 
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Figure 5: Fitted model of risk perception and worry about stranger violence 
 
 
 
 
  
Structural equation modelling using MPlus 7.11. Boxes indicates single manifest indicator.  
Circle indicates latent  variables (measurement model for ‘worry’ not presented for visual ease). 
Note that the lines that intercept the directed arrows indicate posited interactive effects. 
Unstandardized coefficients. Gender and age controls included. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
Chi square 103 (df 12), p<.0005. CFI .982, TLI .956, RMSEA .055 (90% CI .045, .065). 
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Figure 6: Adding primary and secondary victimization to the fitted model 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Structural equation modelling using MPlus 7.11. Boxes indicates single manifest indicator.  
Circle indicates latent  variables (measurement model for ‘worry’ not presented for visual ease). 
Note that the lines that intercept the directed arrows indicate posited interactive effects. 
Note that perceived controllability and perceived consequence are correlated (r=-.20***). 
Unstandardized coefficients. Gender and age controls included. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
Chi square 130 (df 18), p<.0005. CFI .980, TLI .955, RMSEA .050 (90% CI .042, .058). 
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Table 1: Demographic composition of the three sub-samples 
 
 Gender Age Education 
(years) 
Location 
 Male  
% 
Female 
% 
Mean SD Mean SD Big 
city  
% 
Suburbs or 
outskirts of 
a big city 
% 
Town or 
small 
city % 
Country 
village 
% 
Farm or 
home in 
the country 
% 
Italy 51% 49% 48 18 11 5 15% 10% 28% 45% 1% 
Bulgaria 57% 43% 52 18 12 4 37% 6% 26% 31% 0% 
Lithuania 57% 43% 51 18 14 4 43% 0% 22% 33% 1% 
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Table 2. Summary of fitted interaction effects involving need for cognitive closure moderating 
victimization experience 
 coeff S.E. coeff./S.E. p-value 
Predicting worry about future victimization 
    
   Primary victimization experience 
.83 .12 7.10 <.0005*** 
   Secondary victimization experience  
.38 .05 8.28 <.0005*** 
   Need for cognitive closure 
.04 .05 .87 .39 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with primary victimization experience 
.20 .33 .61 .55 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with secondary victimization experience 
.34 .13 2.54 .01* 
Predicting perceived likelihood of violent victimization 
    
   Primary victimization experience 
.60 .11 5.72 <.0005*** 
   Secondary victimization experience  
.28 .05 6.15 <.0005*** 
   Need for cognitive closure 
.00 .07 .02 .99 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with primary victimization experience 
-.03 .28 -.10 .92 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with secondary victimization experience 
.23 .13 1.72 .09 
Predicting perceived consequence of violent victimization 
    
   Primary victimization experience 
.03 .12 .21 .84 
   Secondary victimization experience  
.22 .06 3.9 <.0005*** 
   Need for cognitive closure 
.49 .09 5.23 <.0005*** 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with primary victimization experience 
-.14 .34 -.42 .68 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with secondary victimization experience 
-.17 .16 -1.07 .29 
Predicting perceived control over violent victimization 
    
   Primary victimization experience 
-.06 .11 -.54 .59 
   Secondary victimization experience  
.07 .05 1.26 .21 
   Need for cognitive closure 
.02 .08 .25 .80 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with primary victimization experience 
-.11 .31 -.36 .72 
   Need for cognitive closure interaction with secondary victimization experience 
-.25 .16 -1.56 .12 
Note: coeff = unstandardized coefficient. S.E. = standard error. Interaction effects estimated in 4 blocks, i.e. 
separately for each of worry, perceived likelihood, perceived consequence and perceived control. *=p<.05, 
**=p<.01, ***=p<.001. 
 
